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The aim of this paper is to analyse the announcement effects on exchange rate 
movements using the basic asset pricing model, where currency trade is partly 
determined by technical trading in the form of moving averages since it is the 
most commonly used technique according to questionnaire surveys. Specifically, 
the announcement and implementation of temporary as well as permanent 
monetary policy are analysed, where the exchange rate model developed is 
summarised in a linear difference equation in current exogenous fundamentals, a 
large number of lags of the endogenous exchange rate and time-t dating of 
exchange rate expectations. However, since there are a large number of rational 
expectations equilibria, continuity is proposed as a selection criterion among the 
equilibria, meaning that the parameter for the time-t – 1 exchange rate should 
have the limit 0 when there is no technical trading to have an economically 
meaningful equilibrium. It turns out that there is a unique rational expectations 
equilibrium that satisfy the continuity criterion, and focusing on this equilibrium, 
it is shown that the exchange rate is much more sensitive to changes in money 
supply than when technical trading is absent in currency trade. This result is 
important since it sheds light on the so-called exchange rate disconnect puzzle in 
international finance. 
 
Key words: asset pricing, exchange rate disconnect puzzle, heterogeneous agents, 
least squares learnability, monetary policy and technical trading. 
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Uutisointi, valuuttakurssidynamiikka ja 
rationaalisten odotusten tasapaino: 
jatkuvuuteen perustuva tasapainon valintakriteeri 
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Keskustelualoitteita 6/2006 
Mikael Bask 
Rahapolitiikka- ja tutkimusosasto 
 
Tiivistelmä 
Tässä tutkimuksessa analysoidaan, miten uutisointi vaikuttaa nimellisen valuutta-
kurssin liikkeisiin yksinkertaisessa rahoitusvaateiden hinnoittelumallissa, jossa 
myös tekninen kaupankäynti vaikuttaa yksittäisen valuutan markkinahintaan. 
Teknisellä kaupankäynnillä tarkoitetaan tässä liukuvaan keskiarvoon perustuvaa 
valuutan hinnoittelua, jota monet valuuttamarkkinoilla toimivat haastattelututki-
musten mukaan nähtävästi käyttävät. Tässä työssä tutkitaan erityisesti pysyvien ja 
tilapäisten rahapoliittisten toimenpiteiden uutisointiin ja toteutukseen liittyviä 
valuuttamarkkinavaikutuksia mallissa, jossa nimellisen valuuttakurssin dynamiik-
ka määräytyy sen oman historian, vallitsevien talouden perustekijöiden sekä 
valuuttakurssin odotetun tulevan kehityksen perusteella. Mallissa on kuitenkin 
useita rationaalisten odotusten valuuttakurssiratkaisuja, tästä syystä työssä esite-
tään tasapainon valintaperustaksi jatkuvuutta. Tällöin taloudellisesti mielekkäässä 
tasapainossa valuutan markkinoilla vallitsevan arvon riippuvuus edeltävän perio-
din arvosta häviää, kun teknisen kaupankäynnin merkitys valuuttamarkkinoilla 
supistuu olemattomiin. Työssä osoitetaan, että mallin tasapainojen joukosta löytyy 
yksikäsitteinen rationaalisten odotusten tasapaino, joka toteuttaa tällaisen jat-
kuvuusominaisuuden. Lisäksi osoitetaan, että tällaisessa tasapainossa nimellinen 
valuuttakurssi reagoi selvästi herkemmin rahan tarjonnan muutoksiin kuin siinä 
tapauksessa, että teknistä kaupankäyntiä ei olisi valuuttamarkkinoilla lainkaan. 
Tutkimuksen tulosta on pidettävä tärkeänä, koska se tarjoaa mahdollisen ratkaisun 
kansainvälistä rahataloutta jo pitkään askarruttaneeseen ongelmaan nimellisen 
valuuttakurssin liikehdinnästä, joka on talouden perustekijöistä irrallaan. 
 
Avainsanat: varallisuuden hinnoittelu, valuuttakurssien liialliset vaihtelut, hetero-
geeniset taloudenpitäjät, pienimmän neliösumman ennusteet, tasapainon opitta-
vuus, rahapolitiikka ja tekninen kaupankäynti 
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It is a well-known fact that models in economics and ﬁnance, in which agents
have rational expectations regarding some of the variables in the model,
may exhibit a multiplicity of rational expectations equilibria (REE). This is
problematic. For instance, without imposing additional restrictions into such
am o d e l ,i ti sn o tk n o w ni na d v a n c ew h i c ho ft h eR E Et h a tt h ea g e n t sw i l l
coordinate on. Consequently, to give one example, the eﬀects of monetary
policy changes is not known beforehand. Is it the case that the agents will
coordinate on an equilibrium that has undesirable properties, like a very high
inﬂation rate?
One way trying to circumvent the problem with a multiplicity of REE is by
simplicity. Therefore, the minimal state variable (MSV) solution, suggested by
McCallum (1983), may be of interest, which is the solution to a linear diﬀerence
equation that depends linearly on a set of variables such that there does not
exist a solution that depends linearly on a smaller set of variables. Of course,
there is no guarantee that the agents will coordinate on the MSV solution, but
it is often a mathematically tractable solution that is useful as a benchmark
when investigating the properties of other REE in the model. Another way
to reduce the number of equilibria that are attainable, is by focusing on the
REE that are a possible result of an adaptive learning process for the agents.
It can be assumed that the agents’ expectations are formed by a correctly
speciﬁed model, ie, a model that corresponds to the REE, but without having
perfect knowledge about the parameters in the model. However, using past
and current values of the variables in the model, the parameters are learned
over time since the beliefs are revised as new information is gained. Evans and
Honkapohja (2001) provide a nice introduction to this literature.
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,i ti sn o ta l w a y st h ec a s et h a ta d a p t i v el e a r n i n ga sas e l e c t i o n
criterion is able to reduce the number of reasonable REE in a satisfactory way.
Therefore, additional tools are necessary to use to ﬁnd the equilibria that the
agents most likely coordinate on. One purpose of this paper is to argue that
continuity should hold for a REE to be economically meaningful, meaning that
if the model in focus nests another model, then a root to the general model
should have a root to the nested model as its limit. Therefore, the proposed
selection criterion is in the spirit of McCallum’s (1983) procedure to single out
the REE that ‘do not possess peculiar or aberational properties’ (p. 141). To
make the suggested procedure more comprehensible, an exchange rate model
augmented with technical trading is developed and analyzed.
Starting with the basic asset pricing model that consists of two parity
conditions, uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) and purchasing power parity
(PPP), as well as equilibrium conditions at the domestic and foreign money
markets, and, then, closing the model by assuming that the agents have
rational expectations regarding the exchange rate, a linear diﬀerence equation
for the model is derived. It turns out that the endogenous exchange rate is a
function of current exogenous fundamentals and the expected exchange rate in
the next time period, based on the information set available at time t.T h e n ,
if the model is solved for the current exchange rate, it is a function of current
and expected future fundamentals. Moreover, if we ignore rational bubble
7solutions, the model has a unique REE that also is adaptively learnable. Now,
w h a th a p p e n si fw ea u g m e n tt h ee x c h a n g er a t em o d e lw i t ha g e n t st h a tu s e
technical trading, or chartism, in currency trade? Will it still be the case
that there is a unique REE in the model? If not, will adaptive learnability
as a selection criterion be able to single out a unique REE? The answer to
both questions is no. The proposed selection criterion, however, will solve the
problem with a multiplicity of REE by selecting a unique equilibrium.
Technical trading is introduced into the model in the form of a moving
average technique. According to this technique, buying and selling signals
a r eg e n e r a t e db yt w om o v i n ga v e r a g e so fp a s te x c h a n g er a t e s ;as h o r t - p e r i o d
moving average and a long-period moving average, where a buy (sell) signal is
generated when the short-period moving average rises above (falls below) the
long-period moving average. In the model developed, the short-period moving
a v e r a g ei st h ec u r r e n te x c h a n g er a t ea n dt h el o n g - p e r i o dm o v i n ga v e r a g ei s
an exponentially weighted moving average of current and past exchange rates.
That chartism is used extensively in currency trade is conﬁrmed in several
questionnaire surveys made at foreign exchange markets around the world.
Examples are Cheung and Chinn (2001), who conducted a survey at the U.S.
market; Lui and Mole (1998), who conducted a survey at the Hong Kong
market; Menkhoﬀ (1997), who conducted a survey at the German market;
Oberlechner (2001), who conducted a survey at the markets in Frankfurt,
London, Vienna and Zurich; and Taylor and Allen (1992), who conducted a
survey at the London market. An extensive exploration of the psychology in
currency trade may also be found in Oberlechner (2004), which is based on
surveys conducted at the European and the North American markets.
According to the surveys, the relative importance of technical versus
fundamental analysis in the currency market depends on the time horizon
in currency trade. For shorter time horizons, more weight is placed on
technical analysis, or chartism, while more weight is placed on fundamental
analysis for longer horizons. Moreover, moving averages is the most commonly
used technical trading technique in currency trade, which motivates why it is
introduced into the model developed. Since it is assumed that the long-period
moving average is a moving average of current and past exchange rates, it turns
out that the endogenous exchange rate is a function of current exogenous
fundamentals, a large number of lags of the exchange rate as well as the
expected exchange rate in the next time period, based on the information set
available at time t. Then, by assuming that the agents who use fundamental
analysis have rational expectations regarding the exchange rate, we can solve
the model for the current exchange rate, which, obviously, no longer is only a
function of current and expected future fundamentals, but also a function of
past exchange rates.
N o ts u r p r i s i n g l y ,t h e r ei sal a r g en u m b e ro fR E Ei nt h em o d e l .
Consequently, it is necessary to ﬁnd a useful tool to single out the economically
meaningful equilibria, especially since adaptive learnability is not able to pick
a unique REE. This tool is also found in the model developed by observing
the behavior of the exchange rate when the time horizon in currency trade is
approaching inﬁnity. It turns out that the parameter for the time-t−1 exchange
rate should have the limit 0 since, otherwise, there would be a discontinuity in
8the magnitude of a monetary policy multiplier when, loosely speaking, going
from an inﬁnite to a ﬁnite time horizon in currency trade. In fact, continuity
is a powerful selection criterion since there is only one of a large number of
REE that satisfy this criterion.
Focusing on this unique REE, it is shown that the exchange rate is much
more sensitive to changes in money supply than when technical trading is
absent in currency trade. For example, when there is a temporary change
in money supply, there may be a magniﬁcation eﬀect on the exchange rate,
meaning that a one percent increase (decrease) in money supply is depreciating
(appreciating) the exchange rate withm o r et h a no n ep e r c e n t . T h i sr e s u l t
is important since it sheds light on the so-called exchange rate disconnect
puzzle in international ﬁnance. To be more speciﬁc, the empirical literature
demonstrates that there are often large movements in nominal exchange rates
that are apparently unexplained by macroeconomic fundamentals. Frankel and
Froot (1990) write:
‘[...] the proportion of exchange rate movements that can
be explained even after the fact, using contemporaneous
macroeconomic variables, is disturbingly low’ (p. 73).
B ea w a r et h a tt h em a g n i ﬁcation eﬀect on the exchange rate is not dependent
on any rigidities in the model, like price inertia as in the Dornbusch (1976)
overshooting model. Moreover, it is not necessary to view temporary changes
in money supply as monetary policy changes. Instead, which makes the model
developed even more appealing, it can be viewed as monetary disturbances.
Thus, small shocks to the fundamentals may cause a volatile exchange rate.
The foreign exchange model developed is presented and discussed in Section
2, and the formal analysis of it is carried through in Section 3. Section 4
contains a concluding discussion, and the proofs of two propositions, etc., can
be found in the Appendix.
2M o d e l
The benchmark model is presented in Section 2.1, which is a basic asset pricing
model for exchange rate determination. Thereafter, in Section 2.2, the market
expectations regarding the exchange rate and the exchange rate expectations
formed by fundamental analysis and chartism are formulated and discussed.
2.1 Benchmark model
The benchmark model consists of two parity conditions, UIP and PPP, as well
as equilibrium conditions at the domestic and foreign money markets.
92.1.1 UIP
The ﬁrst parity condition is UIP, which states that the expected change of
t h ee x c h a n g er a t ei se q u a lt ot h ed i ﬀerence between the domestic and foreign
interest rates
s
e [t +1 ]− s[t]=i[t] − i
∗ [t], (2.1)
where s is the spot nominal exchange rate, and i and i∗ are the domestic and
foreign nominal interest rates, respectively. Moreover, the exchange rate is
deﬁned as the domestic price of the foreign currency, and the superscript e
denotes expectations.
The parity condition in (2.1) is based on the assumption that domestic
and foreign assets are perfect substitutes, which only holds if there is perfect
capital mobility. Since the latter also is assumed, only the slightest diﬀerence
in expected yields would draw the entire capital into the asset that oﬀers
the highest expected yield. Thus, the parity condition in (2.1) is also an
equilibrium condition at the international asset market.
2.1.2 PPP
The second parity condition is PPP, which states that the exchange rate is
equal to the diﬀerence between the domestic and foreign price levels
s[t]=p[t] − p
∗ [t], (2.2)
where p and p∗ are the domestic and foreign nominal price levels, respectively.
The parity condition in (2.2) means that the domestic and foreign price
levels, expressed in a common currency, are equal to each other. Thus,
according to PPP, a relative increase (decrease) in the domestic price level
not only means that the domestic price of the foreign currency increases
(decreases), it also means that the increase (decrease) in the exchange rate
is of such a magnitude that the price levels, expressed in a common currency,
are still equal to each other.
2.1.3 Money market equilibriums
Equilibrium at the domestic and foreign money markets hold when real money
supply is equal to real money demand
m[t] − p[t]=αy [t] − βi[t], (2.3)
and
m
∗ [t] − p
∗ [t]=αy
∗ [t] − βi
∗ [t], (2.4)
where m and m∗ are the domestic and foreign nominal money supplies, and
y and y∗ are the domestic and foreign real incomes, respectively. Thus, real
10money demand increases (decreases) when real income increases (decreases)
or the interest rate decreases (increases). Note that we assume that the real
income elasticities in (2.3)—(2.4) are equal to each other. The same assumption
is also made for the interest rate (semi-)elasticities in (2.3)—(2.4).
2.2 Expectations formations
After presenting the benchmark model, the expected exchange rate, se,w i l l
now be the focus of interest. In short, we will assume that the agents who use
fundamental analysis in currency trade have rational expectations regarding
the next time period’s exchange rate. Moreover, these agents know that there
are agents who use technical trading techniques in currency trade, and they
take this into account when forming their exchange rate expectations.
2.2.1 Market expectations
According to questionnaire surveys (see references in Section 1), the relative
importance of technical versus fundamental analysis in the currency market
depends on the time horizon in currency trade. For shorter time horizons,
more weight is placed on technical analysis, or chartism, while more weight is
placed on fundamental analysis for longer horizons.
This observation is formulated as
s
e [t +1 ]=ω(τ)s
e
f [t +1 ]+( 1− ω(τ))s
e
c [t +1 ], (2.5)
where se, se
f and se
c are the market expectations and the expectations formed
by fundamental analysis and chartism about the next time period’s exchange
rate, respectively. Moreover, ω(τ) is a weight function that depends on the
‘artiﬁcial’ time horizon, τ, in currency trade
ω(τ)=1− exp(−τ), (2.6)
which is exogenously given in the model.
2.2.2 Fundamental analysis
When fundamental analysis is used in currency trade, it is assumed that the




f [t +1 ]=E [s[t +1 ] ], (2.7)
where E [s[t +1 ] ]is equal to the mathematical expectation of s[t +1 ]based
on the information set available at time t, which includes the knowledge of the
complete model as well as the realized values of all variables in the model up
11to and including time t.1 Thus, because currency trade based on chartism is
aﬀecting the exchange rate (as will be clear below), currency trade based on
fundamental analysis will take this into account when forming exchange rate
expectations.
2.2.3 Chartism
As was mentioned in Section 1, chartism utilizes past exchange rates to detect
patterns that are extrapolated into the future. Focusing on past exchange
rates is not considered as a shortcoming for agents using any of these technical
trading techniques since a primary assumption behind technical analysis is that
all relevant information about future exchange rate movements is contained in
past movements. Thus, chartism is purely behavioristic in nature and does
not examine the underlying reasons of currency traders.
The most commonly used technical trading technique is moving averages
(see Lui and Mole (1998) and Taylor and Allen (1992)). According to this
trading technique, buying and selling signals are generated by two moving
averages; a short-period moving average and a long-period moving average.
Speciﬁcally, a buy (sell) signal is generated when the short-period moving
average rises above (falls below) the long-period moving average. In its simplest
form, the short-period moving average is the current exchange rate and the
long-period moving average is an exponentially weighted moving average of
current and past exchange rates.
Thus, it is expected that the exchange rate will increase (decrease) when
the current exchange rate is higher (lower) than an exponentially weighted
moving average of current and past exchange rates
s
e
c [t +1 ]− s[t]=γ (s[t] − MA[t]). (2.8)




exp(−jv)s[t − j], (2.9)





Note that when v → 0 or v →∞ , the long-period moving average in (2.9) does
not depend at all on past exchange rates. Speciﬁcally, for small v, all weights
in the long-period moving average get small, including the weight given to the
1 To make the mathematical notation more compact, E [s[t +1 ] ] is a shortcut for
E [s[t +1 ]|z[t]],w h e r ez[t] is the information set available at time t.
2 In the formal analysis below, we will focus our attention on the case when the
long-period moving average in (2.9) is a moving average of a large but ﬁnite number of
past exchange rates. An obvious justiﬁcation for this is the lack of an inﬁnite amount of
data.
12c u r r e n te x c h a n g er a t e ,w h i l ef o rl a r g ev, only the weights for past exchange
rates get small, but the weight given to the current exchange rate approaches
1.
However, even if past exchange rates do not aﬀect the expected exchange
rate, as in these special cases, the market expectations and the expectations
formed by fundamental analysis do not coincide. Still, the time horizon in
currency trade is not necessarily inﬁnitely long, which means that technical
trading aﬀects the exchange rate (as will be clear below).
3 Announcement eﬀects of monetary policy
The complete model is summarized in a linear expectational diﬀerence
equation, which is stated in Proposition 3.1 below. Obviously, since both
chartism and fundamental analysis are used in currency trade, the current
exchange rate is aﬀected by past exchange rates (see the second term at the
right-hand side of (3.1) below) as well as expectational matters (see the third
term at the right-hand side of (3.1) below).
Proposition 3.1 The expectational diﬀerence equation for the complete model
is
s[t]=x1f [t] − x2
∞ X
j=1
exp(−jv)s[t − j]+x3E [s[t +1 ] ], (3.1)
where the fundamentals are summarized in
f [t] ≡ m[t] − m















Two cases are considered in the analysis of the expectational diﬀerence
equation in (3.1); a special case in Section 3.1, and the general case in Section
3.2. In Section 3.1, it is assumed that the time horizon in currency trade is
inﬁnitely long, which means that currency trade is based only on fundamental
analysis. Thus, the complete model reduces to a ‘traditional’ foreign exchange
model.
After solving the model in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.2.1, it is investigated, in
Sections 3.1.2 and 3.2.2, whether the agents that use fundamental analysis
adaptively learn the REE in the model via recursive least squares. Thereafter,
in Sections 3.1.3 and 3.2.3, the eﬀects on exchange rate movements of
the announcement and implementation of temporary as well as permanent
monetary policy are analyzed. A main contribution in this paper is found in
the latter section, because it is demonstrated therein that there is only one of
a large number of REE that is economically meaningful.
13We will assume throughout the whole paper that the law of iterated
expectations as well as the necessary transversality conditions hold. The
latter assumption means that we can rule out rational bubble solutions in
the analysis.
3.1 Case: inﬁnitely long time horizon
3.1.1 Solution of the model








· E [s[t +1 ] ], (3.4)











· E [f [t + k]], (3.5)
which can be conﬁrmed via direct substitution into (3.4). Before investigating
the announcement eﬀects of monetary policy on exchange rate movements, we
must examine whether the model in (3.5) is adaptively learnable.
3.1.2 Adaptive learnability of the model
The assumption in (2.7) is that when fundamental analysis is used in currency
trade, the agents have rational expectations in the sense that the expected
exchange rate is equal to the mathematical expectation of the exchange rate
conditioned on all information available to the currency trader. Thus, since
this information not only includes past and current values of the variables in
the model, but also a complete knowledge about the structure of the model,
rational expectations is a rather strong assumption. This assumption has,
therefore, in the more recent literature, been complemented by an analysis of
the possible convergence to the REE. Such analysis will also be accomplished
in this paper.
It will be assumed that expectations are formed by a correctly speciﬁed
model, ie, a model that corresponds to the REE, but without having perfect
knowledge about the parameters in the model. However, using past and current
values of the variables in the model, the parameters are learned over time since
the beliefs are revised as new information is gained. Thus, one may think of
the agents that use fundamental analysis that they act as econometricians
who adaptively learn the parameters in the model. Speciﬁcally, it will be
investigated whether the model is characterized by least squares learnability.
However, since expectational stability, ie, E-stability, implies least squares
learnability (see, eg, Evans and Honkapohja (2001)), the focus in the analysis
14will be on E-stability. This is because the latter concept is easier to handle
mathematically.
It should be mentioned at this stage that the E-stability analysis below of
the basic asset pricing model in (3.5) is novel in the literature. Typically, a
parametric model is speciﬁed for the fundamentals, which is in stark contrast
with the so-called forward-solution of (3.4) that we focus on in the E-stability
analysis.













e [t + k], (3.6)
where fe is the expected value of the fundamentals that may diﬀer from the
mathematically expected value of the fundamentals. Then, turning to the
learning environment, it is assumed that the agents that use fundamental
analysis, hereafter called the fundamentalists, know the functional form of the
foreign exchange model in (3.6), but without having perfect knowledge about






e [t + k], (3.7)
where {βk}
∞
k=0 are the parameters that are estimated by the agents.
Consequently, if these parameters diﬀer from the corresponding parameters
in (3.6), the fundamentalists have non-rational expectations.
The appropriate forecast of the next time period’s exchange rate, se [t +1 ] ,
is, according to (3.7),
s




e [t + k +1 ], (3.8)



















e [t + k +1 ].
The ﬁrst row in (3.9) is the expectational diﬀerence equation in (3.4) allowing
for non-rational expectations, and the second row in (3.9) is the actual law of
motion (ALM) of the exchange rate.
The question is now whether the parameters in the PLM will converge
to the parameters in the ALM, ie, if the foreign exchange model in (3.5) is
characterized by E-stability? To investigate this, note that there is a mapping,














































where k ∈ N+ and τa is ‘artiﬁcial’ time. According to Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) (and references therein), the REE is E-stable if the REE is locally







= −1 < 0, (3.12)
where k ∈ N, the foreign exchange model in (3.5) is characterized by
E-stability, which means that the model also is characterized by least squares
learnability.
3.1.3 Monetary policy: announcement and implementation
Since the foreign exchange model in (3.5) is adaptively learnable for the
fundamentalists, it makes sense to use this model to investigate the eﬀects on
exchange rate movements of monetary policy changes. Note that we interpret
monetary policy changes as changes in a monetary aggregate, which in this
paper is the domestic money supply.
To begin with, the eﬀe c to nt h ee x c h a n g er a t eo fatemporary change in











which means that the exchange rate is depreciating (appreciating) less than
the size of the increase (decrease) in the domestic money supply. However, if
real money demand is not aﬀected by a change in the interest rate, ie, if β =0 ,
the multiplier in (3.13) is equal to 1. On the other hand, the more sensitive
real money demand is to a change in the interest rate, the smaller is the eﬀect
on the exchange rate. In the next time period, which is the period after the
temporary change in money supply, the exchange rate will return to the level
it had before the change in monetary policy.
If we turn to the case of a permanent change in the domestic money supply,
which takes place at time t = t0,t h ee ﬀect on the exchange rate is
ds[t0]
dm[t0]




which means that the eﬀect is one-to-one, ie, a one percent increase (decrease)
in the domestic money supply is depreciating (appreciating) the exchange rate
with one percent.
3 Derivations of most of the equations in this section can be found in the Appendix.
16Then, what is the eﬀe c to nt h ee x c h a n g er a t eo faf u t u r em o n e t a r yp o l i c y
change that is announced today? Let us start with an announced temporary
change in the domestic money supply at time t = t0 that will take place a ≥ 1















which means that the exchange rate is depreciating (appreciating) even less
than when the change in monetary policy is implemented the same time period
as it is announced, as is the case in (3.13).
T h ee x c h a n g er a t ei s ,o fc o u r s e ,n o to n l ya ﬀected at time t = t0,b u ti na l l
time periods from the announcement until the temporary change in monetary
policy is actually implemented. Generally, if 0 ≤ t1 ≤ a − 1 is the number of















Thus, as the time evolves after the announcement of the new monetary
policy, the eﬀect on the exchange rate will be larger and larger. In the
end, when the new policy is actually implemented, the eﬀect is described by
(3.13). Thereafter, in the time period after the change in monetary policy, the
exchange rate will return to the level it had before the announcement of the
new policy.
If we now turn to the case of an announced permanent change in the
domestic money supply, that is announced at time t = t0 and implemented


















which is a smaller multiplier than the one-to-one multiplier in (3.14). In
fact, the more distant in the future the announced monetary policy will be
implemented, the smaller is the immediate eﬀect on the exchange rate.
Again, as in the case with an announced temporary change in monetary
p o l i c y ,t h ee x c h a n g er a t ei sa ﬀected in all time periods from the announcement
until the permanent change in monetary policy is actually implemented.
Generally, if 0 ≤ t1 ≤ a − 1 is the number of time periods after the


















Thus, as the time evolves after the announcement of the new monetary policy,
the eﬀect on the exchange rate will be larger and larger. In the end, when the
new policy is actually implemented, the eﬀe c ti so n e - t o - o n e( s e e( 3 . 1 4 ) ) .
Finally, if we compare the adjustments of the exchange rate after an
announced temporary change and an announced permanent change in the














To sum up the ﬁndings in this section, we have analyzed the eﬀects on the
exchange rate of an announced change in monetary policy that later on is
implemented. Speciﬁcally, we have analyzed the eﬀects of an announced
t e m p o r a r yc h a n g ea sw e l la sa na n n o u nced permanent change in monetary
policy, where these changes are in a monetary aggregate.
Not surprisingly, the immediate eﬀect on the exchange rate is larger when
the new monetary policy is permanent than when it is temporary. Moreover,
a permanent policy, compared to a temporary policy, has a larger eﬀect on the
exchange rate when the implementation of the new policy takes place at a later
date than the announcement, and irrespective if the new policy is temporary
or permanent, the eﬀect on the exchange rate will be larger and larger as the
time evolves until the new policy is actually implemented.
T u r n i n gt ot h es p e c i ﬁc magnitudes of the exchange rate eﬀects, there is a
one-to-one eﬀect when a permanent change in monetary policy is implemented,
ie, a one percent increase (decrease) in the domestic money supply is
depreciating (appreciating) the exchange rate with one percent. When the
change in monetary policy is temporary, the size of the exchange rate eﬀect
depends negatively on the sensitivity of real money demand to a change in the
interest rate.
Finally, it is, of course, also possible to derive how the monetary policy
multipliers are aﬀected by changes in the structural parameters, but to save
space in the paper, we disregard from these derivations.
After investigating the behavior of the foreign exchange model when the
time horizon in currency trade is inﬁnitely long, we will turn to the general case
in which both chartism and fundamental analysis are aﬀecting the exchange
rate. Thus, we will turn to the main section of this paper.
3.2 General case
To begin with, the focus in this section will be on the expectational diﬀerence
equation
s[t]=x1f [t] − x2
jmax X
j=1
exp(−jv)s[t − j]+x3E [s[t +1 ] ], (3.20)
where jmax is large, and not on (3.1). Of course, in the limit when jmax →∞ ,
(3.20) coincides with (3.1).
183.2.1 Solutions of the model
The aim is here to determine a general solution of a similar form as when the
time horizon in currency trade is inﬁnitely long (see (3.5)), ie, we will determine
a solution in which also the expected fundamentals in all future time periods
are part of the solution, and not only current fundamentals. Be aware that
the MSV solution is not appropriate to analyze the announcement eﬀects on
exchange rate movements since expected future fundamentals are not part of












j=1 are parameters to be determined, and where kmax is
large. Assuming that the general solution in (3.21) is correct, determine the
rationally formed forecast of the next time period’s exchange rate, substitute
this forecast into the expectational diﬀerence equation in (3.20), and solve the








βj+1x3 − x2 exp(−jv)
¢
s[t − j] − (3.22)
x2 exp(−jmaxv)
1 − β1x3









βjmax+1+kE [f [t + k +1 ] ].
Then, the solutions to the following equation system determine the parameters
in (3.21)
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨


















j=2 in the equation system in (3.23) depend β1.
If the equation system in (3.23) is partly solved via recursion, a general












3E [f [t + k]], (3.24)












3E [f [t + k]]. (3.25)




j=1 in (3.25). However, since it is not
necessary to explicitly make use of all parameters for past exchange rates, we
skip all these derivations, except the derivation of β1. Obviously, (3.25) is not
easy to analyze since, according to Proposition 3.2 below, there are jmax +1
roots to the equation that determines β1. This also means that there are
jmax +1solutions to each of the parameters in (3.25).














Note that when the time horizon in currency trade is inﬁnitely long in (3.26),
β1 =0since x2|τ→∞ =0 . According to (3.23), this also implies that all
parameters for the lagged exchange rates in (3.25) vanish. Moreover, since
x1|τ→∞ = 1
1+β and x3|τ→∞ =
β
1+β, the second term at the right-hand side
of (3.25) reduces to the term at the right-hand side of (3.5). Certainly, this
should also be the case since the analysis in Section 3.1 is a special case of the
analysis in this section.
3.2.2 Adaptive learnability of the model
Then, is the general solution in (3.25) characterized by least squares
learnability for the fundamentalists? To answer this question, we will
investigate whether the general solution is E-stable since this implies least
squares learnability. Also have in mind in the analysis below that the
fundamentalists take into account that currency trade is partly determined
by technical trading in the form of moving averages when forming exchange
rate expectations.
As in Section 3.1.2, it is assumed that the fundamentalists know the













e [t + k], (3.28)
but without having perfect knowledge about the parameters. Thus, the PLM













j=1 are the parameters that are estimated by the
fundamentalists. Consequently, if these parameters diﬀer from the
20corresponding parameters in (3.28), the fundamentalists have non-rational
expectations.
The appropriate forecast of the next time period’s exchange rate, se [t +1 ] ,
is, according to (3.29),
s
e [t +1 ]=
jmax X
j=1




e [t + k +1 ], (3.30)
which is substituted into












βj+1x3 − x2 exp(−jv)
¢
s[t − j] −
x2 exp(−jmaxv)
1 − β1x3










e [t + k +1 ].
The ﬁrst row in (3.31) is the expectational diﬀerence equation in (3.20) allowing
for non-rational expectations, and the second row in (3.31) is the ALM of the
exchange rate.
To investigate whether the parameters in the PLM will converge to the
parameters in the ALM, note that there is a mapping, M : Rjmax+1+kmax →
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⎠
, (3.32)
where j0 ∈ {1,...,jmax − 1} and j1 ∈ {jmax +2 ,...,jmax +1+kmax}.T h e n ,




























































where j0 ∈ {1,...,jmax − 1} and j1 ∈ {jmax +2 ,...,jmax +1+kmax}. Recall
that all parameters in (3.25) depend on β1, which also means that there are
21jmax+1solutions to these parameters since there are jmax+1solutions to (3.26)
that determines β1. To put it diﬀerently, there are jmax +1sets of parameter
solutions that satisfy the foreign exchange model in (3.25).
Clearly, all parameters for current and expected future fundamentals are







= −1 < 0, (3.34)
where j ∈ {jmax +1 ,...,jmax +1+kmax}. Recall that this result also holds
for the foreign exchange model in (3.5) when the time horizon in currency
t r a d ei si n ﬁnitely long. However, it is not true that all parameters for lagged
exchange rates are locally asymptotically stable under (3.33). In Bask (2006), a
closer investigation of the adaptive learnability of the foreign exchange model
in (3.25) is made for up to seven lagged exchange rates. According to the
analysis, when the number of lagged exchange rates are more than three, there
are two solutions that are not characterized by least squares learnability. Thus,
since there is a multiplicity of REE when there are lagged exchange rates in
the model, the E-stability tool picks the subset of the REE that are adaptively
learnable. However, what is important here is that adaptive learnability is not
able to single out a unique REE.
Two special cases of the model in (3.25) are investigated below when the
announcement eﬀects on exchange rate movements are analyzed. The ﬁrst case,
which hereafter is referred to as a degenerated technical trading technique,i s
when past exchange rates do not aﬀect the expectations formed by chartism,
whereas the second case is when only the most recent exchange rate of past
r a t e si sa ﬀecting the current exchange rate. Of course, we will also investigate
the general setting in (3.25) in which several of the past exchange rates matter
for the current exchange rate. However, it will turn out in the analysis that
the second special case is a good approximation of the foreign exchange model.
A degenerated technical trading technique
A degenerated technical trading technique is investigated in the seminal
paper by Frankel and Froot (1986) in the form of a random walk model.
Speciﬁcally, chartists are introduced into a model with portfolio managers
and fundamentalists, even though the authors do not distinguish between
temporary and permanent monetary policy as well as the announcement
and implementation of the same policy. Furthermore, it is the portfolio
managers who trade in currencies in their model, and they form exchange
rate expectations as a weighted average of the chartists’ and fundamentalists’
expectations. Thus, the diﬀerence between the setup in this paper and
the setup in Frankel and Froot (1986) is only semantic since the market
expectations and the portfolio managers’ expectations are exactly the same.
The most simple way to investigate the case of a degenerated technical
trading technique is to set γ =0in (2.8), which means that an unchanged
exchange rate is expected in the next time period
s
e
c [t +1 ]=s[t]. (3.35)
22Thus, having the analysis in Frankel and Froot (1986) in mind, (3.35) is a
‘random walk’ model in a deterministic setting, even if it is a contradiction
in terms. Moreover, note that (3.35) does not mean that technical trading is
absent in the currency market. Still, depending on the speciﬁct i m eh o r i z o ni n
currency trade, chartism aﬀects the exchange rate (as will be clear below).
Note that since x2|γ=0 =0 ,a l ljmax +1roots to (3.26) are β1 =0 ,w h e r e

































where j0 ∈ {1,...,jmax − 1} and j1 ∈ {jmax +2 ,...,jmax +1+kmax}.T h u s ,
since (3.34) now holds for j ∈ {1,...,jmax +1+kmax}, the foreign exchange
model when a degenerated technical trading technique is used in currency
trade is characterized by least squares learnability. Therefore, it makes sense
to use this model when investigating the eﬀects on exchange rate movements
of monetary policy changes.
Only the most recent exchange rate matters
Besides analyzing a degenerated technical trading technique, the case when
only the most recent exchange rate of past rates is aﬀecting the current
exchange rate is investigated, ie, we will set jmax =1 . There are two reasons for
this. Firstly, this analysis is an easy way to demonstrate the idea behind the
proposed selection criterion that a root to (3.26) should satisfy a certain limit
to be economically meaningful. Secondly, as will be obvious when solving the
model numerically, there is a very small diﬀerence between the monetary policy
multipliers when only the most recent exchange rate of past rates matters and
when, for example, the four most recent exchange rates of past rates matter in
the technical trading technique, ie, when jmax =1and jmax =4 , respectively.
Consequently, the analysis when jmax =1is a good approximation of the
general setting when jmax is large (when jmax →∞ ).






























where j ∈ {3,...,2+kmax}, and where it has already been concluded that
all parameters for current and expected future fundamentals are locally
asymptotically stable under the relevant diﬀerential equation. Thus, since










2 − 1 < 0, (3.38)
the foreign exchange model when only the most recent exchange rate of past
r a t e si sa ﬀecting the current exchange rate is characterized by least squares
learnability. Therefore, it makes sense to use this model too when investigating
the eﬀects on exchange rate movements of monetary policy changes.
233.2.3 Monetary policy: announcement and implementation
To be able to derive the magnitudes of the exchange rate eﬀects, after a change
in monetary policy, it is necessary to know the speciﬁc value of β1.H o w e v e r ,
since there are jmax +1roots to (3.26) that determine β1, it is not easy to
p e r f o r ms u c hat a s k . T h i si sa l s ot h er e a s o nw h yw eﬁrst investigate the
aforementioned special cases, namely, when a degenerated technical trading
t e c h n i q u ei su s e di nc u r r e n c yt r a d ea n dw h e njmax =1 , before turning to the
general setting in which jmax is large (when jmax →∞ ).
A degenerated technical trading technique
Recall that since x2|γ=0 =0 ,a l ljmax +1roots to (3.26) are β1 =0 .






γ=0 E [f [t + k]], (3.39)





β1 =0and x2 =0 .
Now, if we compare the solution in (3.39) with the solution in (3.5), where
the time horizon in currency trade is inﬁnitely long, it is clear that it is
the relative magnitudes of 1
1+β and x1|γ=0 as well as of
β
1+β and x3|γ=0 that
determine whether the exchange rate eﬀect is smaller or larger in the presence







1+β (1 − exp(−τ))
≤ 1, (3.40)
the eﬀect on the exchange rate of a temporary change in the domestic money
supply at time t = t0 is larger when a degenerated technical trading technique
is also used in currency trade
ds[t0]
dm[t0]






¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
γ=0
temporary
= x1|γ=0 . (3.41)
Moreover, the exchange rate eﬀect is larger, the shorter the time horizon in
currency trade is. In the limiting case of only chartism in currency trade, the
eﬀect is one-to-one. In the time period after the temporary change in money
supply, the exchange rate will return to the level it had before the change in
monetary policy.
However, since chartism obviously weakens the link between exchange rates





β (1 − exp(−τ))
1+β (1 − exp(−τ))
≥ 0, (3.42)
the aforementioned result does not necessarily mean that the exchange rate
eﬀects of all kinds of monetary policy changes are larger than when only
24fundamental analysis is used in currency trade. For example, in the case
of a permanent change in the domestic money supply at time t = t0,b o t h
multipliers are equal to 1:4
ds[t0]
dm[t0]










Then, if we pose the same question as we did in the analysis in Section 3.1.3,
what is the eﬀect on the exchange rate of a future monetary policy change that
is announced today? Let us start with an announced temporary change in the










γ=0 < 1, (3.44)
which means that the exchange rate is depreciating (appreciating) even less
than when the change in monetary policy is implemented the same time period
as it is announced, as is the case in (3.41).
Of course, as the time evolves after the announcement of the change in









γ=0 < 1, (3.45)
where 0 ≤ t1 ≤ a−1 is the number of time periods after the announcement. In
the end, when the new policy is actually implemented, the eﬀect is described
by (3.41). Thereafter, in the time period after the change in monetary policy,
the exchange rate will return to the level it had before the announcement of the
new policy. In the limiting case of only chartism in currency trade, there are no
announcement eﬀects on exchange rate movements. This is also obvious since
chartism is backward-looking by nature, and, consequently, is not aﬀected by
the announcement of future policy changes.
T u r n i n gt ot h ec a s eo fa nannounced permanent change in the domestic
money supply, that is announced at time t = t0 and implemented at time












γ=0 < 1, (3.46)
which is a smaller multiplier than the one-to-one multiplier in (3.43). In
fact, the more distant in the future the announced monetary policy will be
implemented, the smaller is the immediate eﬀect on the exchange rate.
Again, if 0 ≤ t1 ≤ a − 1 is the number of time periods after the












γ=0 < 1. (3.47)
4 Derivations of some of the equations in this section can be found in the Appendix,
which are similar as the derivations of the equations in Section 3.1.3.
25Of course, the exchange rate is aﬀected in all time periods from the
announcement until the permanent change in monetary policy, and this eﬀect
will be larger and larger as the time evolves. In the end, when the new policy
is actually implemented, the eﬀe c ti so n e - t o - o n e( s e e( 3 . 4 3 ) ) . A sp r e v i o u s l y
noted in the case of a temporary change in monetary policy, there are no
announcement eﬀects on exchange rate movements when there is only chartism
in currency trade since technical trading is backward-looking by nature.
Finally, if we compare the adjustments of the exchange rate after an
announced temporary change and an announced permanent change in the














A general message in this section is that when the time horizon in currency
trade is shorter, which means that chartism has a larger inﬂuence on
currency trade, the smaller is the diﬀerence between temporary and permanent
monetary policies. This is also natural since chartism weakens the link between
exchange rates and expected future fundamentals. In the limiting case when
only chartism is used in currency trade, this link no longer exists, which also
means that there are no announcement eﬀe c t so ne x c h a n g er a t em o v e m e n t s .
Again, to save space in the paper, we do not derive how the monetary
policy multipliers are aﬀected by changes in the structural parameters as well
as other multiplier relationships.
Let us now turn to another special case of the foreign exchange model in
(3.25), namely, when jmax =1 , before we try to deduce the behavior of the
exchange rate in the general setting when jmax is large (when jmax →∞ ).
Only the most recent exchange rate matters
When jmax =1 , the solution in (3.25) reduces to








3E [f [t + k]], (3.49)


















which means, because x2
x3 is positive when the time horizon in currency trade
is ﬁnite, that one root is positive while the other root is negative. Thus, in
the case when only the most recent exchange rate of past rates is aﬀecting the
current exchange rate, there are two REE in the model.
26Starting with the case of a very long but ﬁnite time horizon in currency




x3 gets very small. Thus, having the second root in mind, the term
x1
1−β1x3 at the right-hand side of (3.49) is, in absolute value, very large. In
fact, in the limit when β1 → 1
x3, the impact of current fundamentals on the
c u r r e n te x c h a n g er a t eb e c o m e si n ﬁnite. Then, turning to the ﬁrst root, which,
obviously, from an economic point of view is more reliable, the terms x1
1−β1x3
and x3 at the right-hand side of (3.49) are close to x1|τ large and x3|τ large,
respectively, and the analysis in Section 3.1.3 is a good approximation of the
behavior of the exchange rate under diﬀerent monetary policies.
Continuing with the case of a very short time horizon in currency trade,
the two roots to (3.50) are very large in absolute value since x2
x3 gets very
large. Thus, the term x1
1−β1x3 is close to 0,a si sa l s ot h et e r mx3,w h i c hm e a n s
that current as well as future expected fundamentals have almost no eﬀect on
the current exchange rate. This result is, of course, natural since chartism
weakens the link between exchange rates and fundamentals. Note that there
is a diﬀerence in this case compared to when a degenerated technical trading
technique is used in currency trade. In the latter case, chartism weakens the
link between exchange rates and expected future fundamentals, whereas, in
this case, chartism also weakens the link between exchange rates and current
fundamentals.
I fw es u m m a r i z ew h a tw i l lt u r no u tt ob ea ni m p o r t a n tﬁnding, there are
two roots to (3.50) that determine β1, which means that there are two REE
in the model. Moreover, which is clear from (3.51), the magnitudes of the two
roots depend on the time horizon in currency trade
β1 = β1 (τ). (3.52)
However, as was demonstrated above, there is only one root with the property
that
lim
τ→∞β1 (τ)=0 , (3.53)
which we hereafter denote β
0
1. This property is important since, if it does not
hold for a root, the complete model would not reduce to the model investigated
in Section 3.1 in a continuous manner when τ →∞ . Loosely speaking, there
would be a discontinuity in the magnitude of a monetary policy multiplier when
going from an inﬁnite to a ﬁnite time horizon in currency trade. However, if
continuity is used as a selection criterion among the REE, there is only one
equilibrium that is economically meaningful.
The general setting
Now, is it the case that continuity can be utilized as a successful selection
criterion in the general setting when jmax is large (when jmax →∞ )? In fact,
this turns out to be the case in the model developed in this paper, and to see
this, let us focus on (3.26) that determines β1. E v e ni fi ti st r u et h a t( 3 . 2 6 )
has jmax +1roots, implying that there are jmax +1REE in the model, if we
ignore rational bubble solutions, there is only one root β
0
1 with the property in
27(3.53). Thus, all other jmax roots imply a discontinuity in the magnitude of a
monetary policy multiplier when going from an inﬁnite to a ﬁnite time horizon
in currency trade, which is not reliable from an economic point of view.
Consequently, if we use continuity as a selection criterion among the REE,
t h ep r o b l e mi st os o l v e( 3 . 2 6 )f o rt h es i n g l er o o tβ
0
1. Obviously, this is not an
easy task since, in general, algebraic equations of degree ﬁve or higher are not
solvable analytically. Besides, even if it would be possible to derive a solution
for the economically interesting root, there is no guarantee that the solution
is easy to handle mathematically in, for example, a comparison of the relative
magnitudes of monetary policy multipliers. Therefore, we will in this paper
solve (3.26) numerically for β
0
1.5
In Figures 1—8 below, we have solved numerically for the single root with
the property in (3.53), where jmax ∈ {1,...,4} in (3.26), to determine the
magnitude of the monetary policy multiplier of a temporary change in the
domestic money supply at time t = t0:6
ds[t0]
dm[t0]








In Figure 1, graphs of the multiplier in (3.54) when jmax =1and jmax =
4, respectively, are shown, corresponding to the cases when only the most
recent exchange rate of past rates as well as the four most recent exchange
rates of past rates matter in the technical trading rule. Moreover, the graph
of the temporary monetary policy multiplier in (3.41) when a degenerated
technical trading technique is used in currency trade is shown. As is clear by
visual inspection of Figure 1, the exchange rate eﬀect of a temporary monetary
policy is larger when moving averages are used in currency trade than when
a degenerated technical trading technique is used. This relationship holds
for all reliable parameter values that we have investigated (ie, the parameter
values that give rise to positive monetary policy multipliers). Moreover, for
all reliable parameter values, the exchange rate eﬀect depends inversely on the
time horizon in currency trade. The parameter values in Figure 1 are β =1 ,
γ =1and v =1 .7
The weight parameter in the long-period moving average in (2.9) is, in Figure
2, decreased from v =1to v =0 .2. Recall that for small v, all weights in the
long-period moving average get small, including the weight given to the current
exchange rate, which, according to the graphs, means that the exchange rate
eﬀect of a temporary monetary policy is even larger when moving averages are
used in currency trade. Obviously, the graph of the monetary policy multiplier
when a degenerated technical trading rule is used is unaﬀected since the
5 MATLAB routines for this purpose are available on request from the author.
6 The derivations of the equations in this section are similar as the derivations of the
equations in Section 3.1.3 and when a degenerated technical trading technique is used in
currency trade. See the Appendix for these derivations.
7 In all ﬁgures in the paper, the share of currency trade that is guided by technical
analysis when τ =0 .05, τ =1 .5 and τ =3is 95.1 percent, 22.3 percent and 5.0 percent,
respectively. These numbers should be compared to Taylor and Allen (1992), who found that
90 percent of the currency traders at the London market placed some weight on technical
analysis at the intraday to one week horizon.


























Only the most recent exchange rate matters
The four most recent exchange rates matter
A degenerated technical trading technique
Figure 1: Graphs of the monetary policy multipliers of a temporary change in
money supply, where the parameter values are β =1 , γ =1and v =1 .N o t e
that the dashed and solid graphs are almost overlapping.
multiplier in (3.41) is independent of v. At the other extreme, when v →∞ ,
only the weights given to past exchange rates in the long-period moving average
get small, but the weight given to the current exchange rate approaches 1.A s
a consequence, the technical trading technique in (2.8) reduces to (3.35), which
means that the graphs of the three monetary policy multipliers overlap each
other. The case v =2is shown in Figure 3.
In Figure 4, the sensitivity of real money demand to a change in the interest
rate is decreased from β =1to β =0 .2, which means that the exchange rate
eﬀect of a temporary monetary policy is not aﬀected so much by a change in
the time horizon in currency trade, and this is true irrespective of the technical
trading technique used. When β =0 , the graphs of the three monetary policy
multipliers overlap each other at the multiplier size 1. On the other hand,
when real money demand is very sensitive to a change in the interest rate, ie,
when β is large, a change in the time horizon in currency trade has a large
impact on the monetary policy multiplier in (3.54). The case β =2is shown
in Figure 5. Note that the magnitudes of the monetary policy multipliers in
Figures 4—5, when the share of currency trade that is guided by chartism is
very small, are approximately given by the multiplier in (3.13).
The parameter that determines the adjustment speed of the exchange rate
according to the moving averages technique in (2.8) is, in Figure 6, decreased
from γ =1to γ =0 .2. This means that the graphs of the monetary policy
multipliers in (3.54) is approaching the monetary policy multiplier when a
degenerated technical trading technique is used in currency trade since this
multiplier is deﬁned by γ =0 . Consequently, the graph of the latter multiplier
is unaﬀected by a slower adjustment speed since it is independent of γ.A tt h e
other extreme, when γ →∞ , the faster adjustment speed means that a change
i nt h em o n e ys u p p l yh a sal a r g ee x c h a n g er a t ee ﬀect. This is also conﬁrmed
in Figure 7, where the case γ =2is shown.






























Only the most recent exchange rate matters
The four most recent exchange rates matter
A degenerated technical trading technique
Figure 2: Graphs of the monetary policy multipliers of a temporary change in
money supply, where the parameter values are β =1 , γ =1and v =0 .2.N o t e
that the dashed and solid graphs are almost overlapping.


























Only the most recent exchange rate matters
The four most recent exchange rates matter
A degenerated technical trading technique
Figure 3: Graphs of the monetary policy multipliers of a temporary change in
money supply, where the parameter values are β =1 , γ =1and v =2 .N o t e
that the dashed and solid graphs are almost overlapping.


























Only the most recent exchange rate matters
The four most recent exchange rates matter
A degenerated technical trading technique
Figure 4: Graphs of the monetary policy multipliers of a temporary change in
money supply, where the parameter values are β =0 .2, γ =1and v =1 .N o t e
that the dashed and solid graphs are almost overlapping.






























Only the most recent exchange rate matters
The four most recent exchange rates matter
A degenerated technical trading technique
Figure 5: Graphs of the monetary policy multipliers of a temporary change in
money supply, where the parameter values are β =2 , γ =1and v =1 .N o t e
that the dashed and solid graphs are almost overlapping.


























Only the most recent exchange rate matters
The four most recent exchange rates matter
A degenerated technical trading technique
Figure 6: Graphs of the monetary policy multipliers of a temporary change in
money supply, where the parameter values are β =1 , γ =0 .2 and v =1 .N o t e
that the dashed and solid graphs are almost overlapping.






























Only the most recent exchange rate matters
The four most recent exchange rates matter
A degenerated technical trading technique
Figure 7: Graphs of the monetary policy multipliers of a temporary change in
money supply, where the parameter values are β =1 , γ =2and v =1 .N o t e
that the dashed and solid graphs are almost overlapping.












































The two most recent exchange rates matter
The three most recent exchange rates matter
The four most recent exchange rates matter
Figure 8: Graphs of the monetary policy multipliers of a temporary change in
money supply, relative to the multiplier when only the most recent exchange
rate matters in the technical trading rule, where the parameter values are
β =1 , γ =1and v =1 .N o t et h es c a l ea tt h ev e r t i c a la x i s .
It has not been mentioned until now, but what is clear by visual inspection
of Figures 1—7, is that the two graphs in each ﬁgure, where moving averages are
used as the technical trading rule, are almost overlapping. Thus, the exchange
rate eﬀect of a change in the domestic money supply seems to be the same
irrespective of the number of past exchange rates in the long-period moving
average in (2.9). A closer examination of this matter reveals that the exchange
rate eﬀect, in fact, decreases when jmax increases, given the time horizon in
currency trade. However, which is demonstrated in Figure 8, this change in
t h ee x c h a n g er a t ee ﬀect becomes smaller and smaller suggesting that when
jmax →∞ , the graph of the temporary monetary policy multiplier still almost
overlap the graph of the same multiplier when jmax =1 .
In Figures 9—13 below, we have solved numerically for the single root with
the property in (3.53), where jmax ∈ {1,...,4} in (3.26), to determine the
magnitude of the monetary policy multiplier of a permanent change in the
domestic money supply at time t = t0
ds[t0]
dm[t0]










where |x3| < 1 since, otherwise, the monetary policy multiplier is of inﬁnite
magnitude (see the second term at the right-hand side of (3.25)).
Obviously, the graph of the permanent monetary policy multiplier in (3.43),
when a degenerated technical trading technique is used in currency trade, is
horizontal at the multiplier size 1 in all ﬁgures. In Figure 9, graphs of the
monetary policy multiplier in (3.55) when jmax =1and jmax =4 , respectively,
a r es h o w n ,a n dt h ep a r a m e t e rv a l u e sa r eβ =1 , γ =1and v =1 ,w h i c hi st h e
same values as in Figure 1. Clearly, there is a magniﬁcation eﬀe c ta ta l lﬁnite
time horizons in currency trade, meaning that a one percent increase (decrease)


























Only the most recent exchange rate matters
The four most recent exchange rates matter
A degenerated technical trading technique
Figure 9: Graphs of the monetary policy multipliers of a permanent change in
money supply, where the parameter values are β =1 , γ =1and v =1 .N o t e
that the dashed and solid graphs are almost overlapping, and that the dotted
graph is horizontal at the multiplier size 1.
in the domestic money supply is depreciating (appreciating) the exchange rate
with more than one percent. Moreover, for all reliable parameter values, the
exchange rate eﬀect depends inversely on the time horizon in currency trade.
The parameter values in Figures 10—12 are the same as in Figures 2, 5 and
7, respectively, and if we compare the graphs of the monetary policy multipliers
in (3.54)—(3.55), it is clear that the exchange rate eﬀect is even larger when
the change in monetary policy is permanent than when it is temporary, given
the time horizon in currency trade. There is also a magniﬁcation eﬀect at all
ﬁnite time horizons in currency trade, and, moreover, the permanent monetary
policy multiplier in (3.55) is aﬀected by changes in the parameters β, γ and
v in the same qualitative way as the temporary monetary policy multiplier in
(3.54). Finally, the graph of the permanent monetary policy multiplier is not
aﬀected so much when the number of past exchange rates in the long-period
moving average in (2.9) is increased, as is shown in Figure 13. Recall a similar
result when the change in the domestic money supply is temporary.
































Only the most recent exchange rate matters
The four most recent exchange rates matter
A degenerated technical trading technique
Figure 10: Graphs of the monetary policy multipliers of a permanent change
in money supply, where the parameter values are β =1 , γ =1and v =0 .2.
Note that the dashed and solid graphs are almost overlapping, and that the
dotted graph is horizontal at the multiplier size 1.
































Only the most recent exchange rate matters
The four most recent exchange rates matter
A degenerated technical trading technique
Figure 11: Graphs of the monetary policy multipliers of a permanent change
in money supply, where the parameter values are β =2 , γ =1and v =1 .
Note that the dashed and solid graphs are almost overlapping, and that the
dotted graph is horizontal at the multiplier size 1.
































Only the most recent exchange rate matters
The four most recent exchange rates matter
A degenerated technical trading technique
Figure 12: Graphs of the monetary policy multipliers of a permanent change
in money supply, where the parameter values are β =1 , γ =2and v =1 .
Note that the dashed and solid graphs are almost overlapping, and that the
dotted graph is horizontal at the multiplier size 1.








































The two most recent exchange rates matter
The three most recent exchange rates matter
The four most recent exchange rates matter
Figure 13: Graphs of the monetary policy multipliers of a permanent change in
money supply, relative to the multiplier when only the most recent exchange
rate matters in the technical trading rule, where the parameter values are
β =1 , γ =1and v =1 .N o t et h es c a l ea tt h ev e r t i c a la x i s .
36Then, what is the announcement eﬀect on the exchange rate of a future
monetary policy change? If we start with an announced temporary change in
the domestic money supply at time t = t0 that will take place a ≥ 1 time
periods from the announcement, the multiplier is
ds[t0]
dm[t0 + a]


























Moreover, as the time evolves after the announcement of the change in
monetary policy, the eﬀect on the exchange rate will be larger and larger
ds[t0 + t1]
dm[t0 + a]


























respectively, where 0 ≤ t1 ≤ a − 1 is the number of time periods after the
announcement. In the end, when the new policy is actually implemented, the
eﬀect is described by (3.54)—(3.55), respectively. Thereafter, in the next time
period and in the case of a temporary change in monetary policy, the exchange
rate will return to the level it had before the announcement of the new policy.
Note again that in the limiting case of only chartism in currency trade, there
are no announcement eﬀects on exchange rate movements.
4 Concluding discussion














3E [f [t + k]], (4.1)
if we substitute β1 = β
0
1 into (3.49), is a good approximation of the general
s o l u t i o ni n( 3 . 2 5 ) . T h i si sb e c a u s et h ee x c h a n g er a t ei nt h ep r e v i o u st i m e
period has a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on the current exchange rate, if there is a
change in the fundamentals like in the domestic money supply, while other
past exchange rates have a second-order eﬀect, a third-order eﬀect, and so on,
on the current exchange rate. Therefore, when analyzing the announcement
eﬀects on exchange rate movements, there is a minor diﬀerence between the
37model in (3.20) when jmax is large and the approximation of the same model
when jmax =1
s[t]=x1f [t] − x2 exp(−v)s[t − 1] + x3E [s[t +1 ] ]. (4.2)
A mathematical advantage of the model in (4.2) is that it is easy to derive an
explicit solution for β
0
1 in (4.1), which is the negative root in (3.51).
Recall that there are no rigidities in the foreign exchange model developed,
like price inertia as in the Dornbusch (1976) overshooting model, since it
is an asset pricing model that consists of two parity conditions, UIP and
PPP, as well as equilibrium conditions at the domestic and foreign money
markets that all hold continuously. Still, there may be a magniﬁcation eﬀect
on the exchange rate when there is a change in monetary policy, meaning
that a one percent increase (decrease) in the domestic money supply is
depreciating (appreciating) the exchange rate with more than one percent,
and this is because currency trade is partly determined by technical trading.
The incorporation of technical trading into the model is motivated by the fact
that these trading techniques are used extensively at foreign exchange markets
around the world. A similarity between the Dornbusch (1976) model and the
model in this paper is that the fundamentalists (which is the only trader type
in Dornbusch (1976)) have rational expectations regarding the exchange rate.
The possibility of a magniﬁcation eﬀect on exchange rate movements is an
important result since it sheds light on the so-called exchange rate disconnect
puzzle in international ﬁnance, where the quote in the introduction by Frankel
and Froot (1990) illustrates the puzzle. That is, the observed volatility of
exchange rates is rarely associated with volatile macroeconomic fundamentals,
meaning that there is a high conditional volatility of exchange rates. Moreover,
since it is not necessary to interpret the temporary changes in the domestic
money supply as monetary policy changes, but, instead, as disturbances to
money supply, the model developed in this paper is an interesting contribution
to the debate on the exchange rate disconnect puzzle. In short, technical
trading in the currency market is a suﬃcient condition for a high conditional
volatility of exchange rates.
Last but not least, a principal aim of this paper has been to demonstrate
how one can reduce a large number of REE in a model by using continuity as
a selection criterion among the equilibria. Speciﬁcally, if the model in focus
nests another model, then a root to the general model should have a root to
the nested model as its limit to be economically meaningful. At a ﬁrst sight,
it may seem that this criterion has a limited applicability. However, having in
mind the large and growing literature on heterogeneous agents in economics
and ﬁnance, we believe the contrary to be true. Thus, in many cases, it is
possible to shrink a heterogenous agents model to one or several homogenous
agents models, eg, one model for each type of agent, and use the continuity
criterion to ﬁnd the REE that are economically meaningful. Focusing on the
model in this paper, the continuity criterion was successful since it was able
to isolate a unique REE. It is our belief that this also is possible in most
other heterogenous agents models in which one group of traders have rational
expectations regarding some of the variables in the model. Of course, it is a
matter of future research to investigate this claim.
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39Appendix
Derivations of some of the equations in Section 3.1.3
In the derivations below, we are making use of appropriate diﬀerentiations of
(3.5) as well as, except in the derivation of (3.19), a one-to-one relationship
between a change in the fundamentals and a change in the domestic money






















































·dm[t0 + a], (4.5)
since the change in monetary policy is announced, E [dm[t0 + a]] =

















































































· dm[t0 + a],
40since df [t0 + k]=df [t0 + a], ∀k ≥ a, and that the change in monetary policy
is announced, E [dm[t0 + k]] = dm[t0 + k], ∀k ≥ a. (3.19):
ds[t0 + t1]
dm[t0 + a]





























































































Derivations of some of the equations in Section 3.2.3
In the derivations below, we are making use of appropriate diﬀerentiations of
(3.39) as well as, except in the derivation of (3.48), a one-to-one relationship
between a change in the fundamentals and a change in the domestic money

















since df [t0 + k]=df [t0], ∀k ≥ 0. (3.46):






















































· dm[t0 + a],
41since df [t0 + k]=df [t0 + a], ∀k ≥ a, and that the change in monetary policy
is announced, E [dm[t0 + k]] = dm[t0 + k], ∀k ≥ a. (3.48):
ds[t0 + t1]
dm[t0 + a]










































Proof of Proposition 3.1
Firstly, substitute the conditions for money market equilibrium in (2.3)-(2.4)
into the condition for PPP in (2.2):
s[t]=m[t] − m
∗ [t] − α(y[t] − y
∗ [t]) + β (i[t] − i
∗ [t]), (4.11)
and, secondly, substitute the condition for UIP in (2.1) into (4.11):
s[t]=m[t] − m
∗ [t] − α(y[t] − y
∗ [t]) + β (s
e [t +1 ]− s[t]), (4.12)



















e [t +1 ], (4.14)
where (3.2) is substituted into (4.13), and we have the benchmark model
summarized in one equation. Next, substitute the expectations formed by
fundamental analysis and chartism in (2.7)-(2.8) into the market expectations
in (2.5):
s
e [t +1 ]=ω(τ)E [s[t +1 ] ]+( 1− ω(τ))(s[t]+γ (s[t] − MA[t])). (4.15)
Thereafter, substitute the long-period moving average in (2.9) into (4.15):
s
e [t +1 ] (4.16)











42(4.16) is the market expectations summarized in one equation. Then, by
substituting the market expectations in (4.16) into the benchmark model in










⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
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(1 − exp(−v))· P∞







⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
.
Then, solve (4.17) for the current exchange rate, and substitute (3.3) as well
as the weight function in (2.6) into the resulting equation, and the proof is
completed.
Proof of Proposition 3.2
Firstly, let j0 =1in the ﬁrst equation in (3.23):
β1 =













Secondly, let j0 =2in the ﬁrst equation in (3.23), and substitute this equation
into (4.18):
β1 =


























and repeat this procedure jmax − 3 times:






































and the proof is completed.
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